Indian Express, North America Edition
New York – March 1, 2016 – Aloke (Al) Ghosh, Professor at Baruch College has been chosen as a recipient of the prestigious Fulbright Aalto University Distinguished Chair Award for research in Finland and other European countries.
Ghosh is a Professor of Accountancy at the Zicklin School of Business. Starting in the summer of 2016, he will engage in scholarly activities, conduct research, give lectures, conduct seminars for doctoral students and faculty, and consult with senior administrations at Aalto University.
“I feel extremely honored to be receiving this prestigious award,” said Ghosh. “Consistent with the Fulbright goals and objectives, my endeavor would be to exemplify the power of international academic exchange, share my knowledge and understanding of cultures with the intention of bridging the academic and cultural gaps between the U.S. and Finland and with the ultimate goal of a more peaceful and prosperous world.”
Professor Ghosh graduated from Tulane University, in New Orleans, where he earned his Ph.D. in Accounting and Economics. His Master’s degree, which is in Economics, is also from Tulane University. Speaking about his expertise and how it has contributed to his selection of the Fulbright Honor he said, “I graduated from Tulane in 1993, which was 23 years ago. Because my academic training includes Economics, Accounting, and Finance, I am able to use an interdisciplinary lens to provide unique and distinctive insights on business subject matter rather than use a specialized lens derived from one area of expertise.” He continued, “My endeavor would be to engage in high quality scholarly research with faculty at Aalto, give lectures on my subject matter of expertise, conduct seminars for doctoral students and faculty, and consult with senior administrations at Aalto University.”
Ghosh has published numerous articles relating to topics in financial reporting and analysis, capital markets, auditing and corporate finance. These articles have appeared in The Journal of Accounting and Economics, The Accounting Review, Review of Accounting Studies, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Finance, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Journal of Corporate Finance, Financial Management, Journal of Management Accounting Research, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, and many others.
With the support of the United States government and through binational partnerships with foreign governments, especially the Fulbright Center in Finland, the Fulbright Scholarship Program sponsors U.S. and foreign participants for exchanges in all areas of endeavor, including the sciences, business, academe, public service, government, and the arts and continues to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. Currently, the Fulbright Program operates in over 155 countries worldwide.
Chatham Professor Earns Distinguished Fulbright Award
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Professor Aloke (Al) Ghosh spoke at the HEC Business School, Switzerland in 2010. During this presentation, Professor Ghosh discusses managerial exposure to losses.
ABSTRACT: A fundamental concern is that CEOs serving as chairs of the board (Chair) might use their power to “extract rents.” In contrast, under efficient contracting theory, depending on the firms’ information and contracting environment, firms can also benefit from one individual holding both positions. Consistent with efficient contracting theory, we find that the prospect of a CEO serving as the Chair increases with the riskiness of a firm, industry concentration, CEOs’ ability and track record, and stronger governance. We also directly test the rent extraction hypothesis by examining whether CEOs use their managerial power from holding the two top positions to derive personal benefits. We find no evidence of adverse consequences from CEOs holding dual positions in the form of excessively high CEO compensation, use of financial reporting discretion to manage earnings, or lower market valuations. There is also no evidence to suggest that CEOs with dual positions build empires through frequent acquisitions or that they pay less dividend. Finally, examination of the stock market returns around the announcement date indicates that investors do not react negatively to the news about an expansion or contraction in the role of a CEO, which is again inconsistent with the rent extraction theory. Overall, our results support the view that the organization of the leadership in U.S. firms is optimally determined for a typical large firm.